Testimony: Who Votes, Who Doesn’t, and Why

Eric McGhee, PPIC research fellow, testified before the Little Hoover Commission in Sacramento today (May 25, 2017). Here are his prepared remarks.


Good morning Chairman Nava, Vice Chairman Varner, and distinguished committee members. My name is Eric McGhee, and I am a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California, where I study voter turnout and electoral and political reform more generally.

California’s voter turnout in 2014 hit record lows in both the primary and the general elections. Turnout recovered some in 2016, but languishing participation remains a concern moving forward. I was invited to your panel to help put California’s turnout in broader context and to give some thoughts on potential solutions. In doing so, I will address three questions:

  1. Who votes, and who doesn’t?
  2. What does California’s turnout look like over time and compared to the rest of the country?
  3. What should we expect from recent reforms, and what else should be tried to improve turnout?

Question #1: Who votes and who doesn’t?
California’s registered voters do not look like the population of all adults in the state. They are older, whiter, better educated, and a little wealthier; they are less mobile, more rooted in their communities, and more likely to own their own home; and they are more likely to identify with one of the two major parties and less likely to identify as independents.

Given California’s large immigrant population, citizenship is also an important factor for voting here. A substantial portion of the Latino and Asian-American populations are not citizens, and many are undocumented and so ineligible to ever become citizens. Historically that has meant significantly lower participation rates among these communities.

Yet the role of citizenship in California’s turnout is changing rapidly. Most of the growth in both the Latino and Asian-American communities now comes from children who are citizens because they are born in the United States. That means a growing share of these communities is eligible to vote, which in turn diversifies the state’s voting-eligible population.

These changes are happening faster here than in other states. Figure 1 shows the share of California’s Latino and Asian-American populations that are eligible to vote, compared with the same eligibility rates in other states. In the early 1990s, California Latinos were less likely to be eligible than were Latinos in other states. Since then, California Latino eligibility has steadily increased and now slightly exceeds Latino eligibility rates elsewhere. Roughly the same is true for Asian-Americans.

In addition to these demographic factors, PPIC research by Mark Baldassare has shown that voters differ from nonvoters in their opinions on policy issues (Baldassare 2016). Likely voters are about evenly split in their approval of a larger, more activist government that spends more money. Nonvoters, by contrast, are clearly in favor of government involvement across a number of issues. For example, 7 in 10 nonvoters want more government action on income inequality; just half of likely voters feel the same.

Question #2: What does California’s turnout look like over time and compared to the rest of the country?
California’s turnout has dropped about 20 points in the last 30 years. To understand the causes and implications of this trend, it is important to break the problem into two separate parts: 1) registration among those who are eligible; and 2) turnout among those who are registered.

Figure 2 shows that California has a registration problem compared with other states. The state’s flat registration rate—always holding steady between about 70 and 80 percent of total eligible residents—masks a relative decline that started in the late 1990s. California registered at higher rates than the rest of the country in the 1990s, but by 2016 had fallen about five percentage points behind.

In addition to the relative registration problem, turnout in California’s midterm elections—when the state votes for governor and other statewide offices—has been falling, while turnout in presidential elections has largely remained flat (Figure 3). This has created a widening divide between the two types of elections. In contrast to registration, this problem is not unique to California. Other states have experienced similar midterm turnout declines. But that does not excuse the problem so much as tell us that it is part of a larger national pattern.

A deeper analysis of these trends suggests different explanations for each one. The first trend—the decline in the relative registration rate—can mostly be explained by the growing Latino and Asian-American populations. No other combination of demographic characteristics, nor the state’s declining competition in statewide elections, comes close to explaining as much as this single change. Latinos and Asian Americans register at the same rates in California and other states. But in any given election, they register at lower rates than non-Hispanic whites or African Americans. Thus, as they become a larger share of the eligible voter population, their lower registration patterns pull down the overall registration rate more in California than in states that are not diversifying as quickly.

In contrast to the registration trend, the decline in midterm turnout is largely a function of the changing behavior of young people. Young people continue to vote in presidential elections, but they are increasingly likely to skip midterms. California’s expanding Latino and Asian-American populations play almost no role here: once registered, these groups have been voting at consistent rates over time. And unlike registration, it is the changing turnout rate of young people that has had the largest effect, not any change in their share of the registered population.

Question #3: What should we expect from recent reforms, and what else should be tried to improve turnout?
California has recently passed a wide range of reforms meant to increase voter turnout. Most of these are meant to ease the registration process, while at least one is meant to make it easier to vote.

The registration changes consist of four main reforms. First, California has allowed 16- and 17-year-olds to “pre-register” with a placeholder record that will only become official when they turn 18. Second, California has established an entirely electronic online registration system that makes it easy to find out how to register and to fill out an application, saving even the trouble of finding a stamp. Third, the state has adopted a “conditional” registration system that permits voters to register and vote in a single trip to the county registrar after the normal registration deadline has passed. And finally, the state has committed to an automated registration system that has the potential to register voters by default when they visit the Department of Motor Vehicles.

The evidence for the efficacy of these reforms varies. Pre-registration is meant to facilitate registration, but research suggests it also helps increase turnout among those who pre-register because it engages them at an impressionable time in their lives (and often in a group setting in their high school or community) (Holbein and Hillygus 2015). Online registration offers significant administrative benefits, but it has not necessarily increased registration or turnout by much (McGhee 2014). For its part, conditional registration is likely to pick up some number of people who miss the registration deadline but decide to vote at the last minute as they get swept up in the excitement of the election. But evidence of its effect on turnout is mixed: some studies have shown a substantial effect, while others have shown something smaller (McGhee 2014).

The final registration reform, automated voter registration, carries perhaps the largest potential to increase registration rates. If implemented properly, the law could increase registration rates by as much as 14 percent in the first year (McGhee and Romero 2016). This may go a long way toward undoing the underrepresentation of Latinos and Asian Americans in the registration rolls. It may also help alleviate some of the need for conditional registration, as more people will be registered throughout the year and do not need to sign up at the eleventh hour. But as I will discuss below, these new registrants need to be mobilized to vote or they may stay home anyway.

In addition to these registration reforms, California is moving toward broad vote-by-mail implementation by enacting a reform first adopted by Colorado in 2012. All voters will get vote-by-mail ballots by default. They can either mail in those ballots or drop them off at any of several drop boxes or “vote centers” that replace neighborhood precincts. If voters lose their vote-by-mail ballot they can have a new one printed at a vote center, and the vote centers will be open for early voting several weeks before Election Day. In short, the new law gives all voters the chance to vote by mail if they want to.

Studies of the effect of this system suggest it saves a great deal of money by limiting the staff and equipment required to operate lightly trafficked polling places (Gronke and Miller 2012; Hall et al. 2012; Folz 2014). The reform may also increase turnout somewhat, though the findings there are mixed (Stein and Vonnahme 2008; Hall et al. 2012; Folz 2014). That said, there is some suggestive evidence that vote-by-mail registrants are more likely to be repeat voters, returning to vote in future elections after showing up in the first one. This pattern is especially notable for young people, meaning it might help alleviate the midterm turnout decline discussed earlier.

Taken together, these reforms place California at the national vanguard for voting access. But we should be wary of complacency. There remain significant issues of implementation and follow-through if these reforms are to increase turnout to the maximum extent.

For example, the ultimate impact of California’s automated voter registration system is dependent on the number of DMV customers who agree to be registered. The new system will certainly be an improvement because it will register any eligible customer who does not actively decline. But it will also require customers to affirm their eligibility to vote before they can be defaulted into registration. While a sensible failsafe measure, this extra step also risks reverting the process back to something like the current system, where DMV customers who skip the section on registration remain unregistered. True default registration would require everyone to answer the eligibility question. In the absence of such a requirement, the success of the new system will hinge in part on how aggressively the eligibility question is pressed upon potential registrants (McGhee and Romero 2016).

There are also a number of implementation challenges for the new Colorado model of voting. One complicated issue concerns how many vote centers to make available for a given population. Since the goal is generally to open fewer vote centers than precincts, it is possible that too few will be opened and voters will have trouble finding a convenient one. Research on the effect of distance on voting has found turnout declines up to 5 percent for distances up to 10 miles from the precinct (Dyck and Gimpel 2005). But since vote centers are more flexible than precincts—they will accept all potential voters no matter where in the county they reside and will be open for weeks rather than just one day—voters may more often find themselves in close proximity to a voting location at a moment when they have some free time to cast a vote.

There are important reasons to be careful about a wholesale switch to the Colorado model of voting. Young people currently choose vote-by-mail less often than older voters because of confusion about what address to use and other issues. If they do choose to vote by mail, they are less likely to send in their ballots on time (Romero 2014). And many people of color are wary of the vote center model because they do not trust the reasons behind it (Romero 2016a, 2016b). That raises the potential for problems with some of the very communities the reform is trying to reach.

Caution is therefore in order. Fortunately, the law is structured to provide it. Under California’s version of the Colorado voting model, each county decides whether to switch to the new system, and even the counties allowed to make the change will be phased in over time. This offers numerous opportunities to assess the rollout and make any necessary adjustments. Given both the promise and potential risks of the Colorado model, it is important to manage the phase-in to ensure the reform is going as expected.

Even if the reforms work as intended, they must still be coupled with aggressive mobilization. While it always makes sense to mobilize as many people as possible in every election, Latinos, Asian Americans, and young people clearly need special attention. Simply placing eligible residents on the voter rolls, or making voting easier, will not solve the whole problem. Outreach will be an important ongoing part of any solution. Research suggests such outreach will be more successful if it is embedded in the communities it is trying to mobilize, with communication by members of the community in ways others in the community understand and relate to (García Bedolla and Michelson 2012). This is especially important because Latino and Asian-American immigrants and their children are least likely to register and may be more culturally and linguistically distinct.

In any case, such mobilization work is hard and must be sustained over many election cycles. Yet it is the effort in many ways best suited to the source of the problem. Many of the biggest legal obstacles to voting in California are now gone or are in the process of being removed. This offers a fresh opportunity to get Californians to engage with the process and make their voices heard.

REFERENCES
Baldassare, Mark. 2016. “California’s Exclusive Electorate: Who Votes and Why It Matters.” San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.
Dyck, Joshua J., and James G. Gimpel. 2005. “Distance, Turnout, and the Convenience of Voting.” Social Science Quarterly 86 (3):531-48.
Folz, David H. 2014. “Vote Centers as a Strategy to Control Election Administration Costs.” SAGE Open 4 (1):1-10.
García Bedolla, Lisa, and Melissa R. Michelson. 2012. Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate through Get-Out-the-Vote Campaigns. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Gronke, Paul, and Peter Miller. 2012. “Voting by Mail and Turnout in Oregon: Revisiting Southwell and Burchett.” American Politics Research 40 (6):976-97.
Hall, Steven R., Joseph Losco, and Raymond Scheele. 2012. “Convenient Turnout: A Case Study of the Indiana Vote Center Pilot Program.” International Journal of Business and Social Science 3 (8):304-12.
Holbein, John B., and D. Sunshine Hillygus. 2015. “Making Young Voters: The Impact of Preregistration on Youth Turnout.” American Journal of Political Science 60 (2):364-82.
McGhee, Eric. 2014. “Expanding California’s Electorate: Will Recent Reforms Increase Voter Turnout? Technical Appendix.” San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.
McGhee, Eric, and Mindy Romero. 2016. “What to Expect from California’s New Motor Voter Law.” San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California. Romero, Mindy. 2014. “Disparities in California’s Uncounted Vote-by-Mail Ballots: Youth, Language Preference, and Military Status.” UC Davis: The California Civic Engagement Project.
———. 2016a. “The California Voter Experience: Vote-by-Mail vs. the Polls.” Davis: UC Davis California Civic Engagement Project.
———. 2016b. “The California Voter Experience: Why African-American Voters Choose to Vote at the Polls or Vote-by-Mail, and How They Perceive Proposed Changes to California’s Voting System.” Davis: UC Davis California Civic Engagement Project.
Stein, Robert M., and Greg Vonnahme. 2008. “Engaging the Unengaged Voter: Vote Centers and Voter Turnout.” The Journal of Politics 70 (02):487-97.

Video: Tom Steyer on the Issues

Tom Steyer—business leader, philanthropist, and possible Democratic candidate for governor—has invested his money and time in activism since leaving the private sector. Moving beyond his initial environmental advocacy, Steyer supported candidates and causes across the state and nation in both the 2014 and 2016 elections.

He sat down to talk to Mark Baldassare, PPIC president and CEO, about his views on policies that will affect the future of California. Steyer would not say whether or not he’s running for governor. But he had a lot to say about the current political climate.

Asked to name three issues that will affect California’s future, Steyer listed priorities that he said are inextricably linked and cut across traditional policy areas:

  • Addressing income inequality: The state has rebounded economically since 2008, Steyer noted, but it is the top 1% of residents who have benefited. While income inequality is a critical issue across the nation, its impact is heightened in California, Steyer said, affecting housing, transportation, education, and incarceration.
  • Investing in our state to rebuild the way we live together: California needs to create a more sustainable way of living that preserves the beauty of the state. “We’ve build the state around the internal combustion engine,” Steyer said. “We have to rebuild the way we live.”
  • Protecting and strengthening our democracy: “California citizens are basically losing a silent fight with special interests,” he said, noting his support for ballot measures that were “direct contests” with special interests, including oil and tobacco companies. “I think the threat to democracy that we’re seeing coming out of Washington, DC, is as profound as I’ve seen in my lifetime.”

Video: Californians’ Views of Trump and Key Proposals

Californians show their partisan colors when asked how they feel about the job performance of President Trump and a number of his proposals—building a wall on the Mexican border, reducing regulation of business, and banning travel to the US by people from six majority Muslim countries. The March PPIC Statewide Survey shows majority approval by Republicans and majority disapproval by Democrats of the president and these policies.

But there is one significant exception. As associate survey director Dean Bonner points out in a briefing on the survey, majorities of Democrats and Republicans say that undocumented immigrants living in the US should be able to stay legally rather than required to leave.

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Read the March PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government
Learn more about the PPIC Statewide Survey

Republican Optimism Spikes after Election

Following the November election, Californians’ views on the state of the nation changed only slightly overall—but the opinions of partisans diverged greatly. In our January 2017 survey, only 36% of Californians said that things in the United States were generally going in the right direction. This was a slight decline from October 2016, when 43% were optimistic. In addition, in January, about half (52%) thought that good economic times could be expected in the next year—a slight increase from October (46%).

The mood of partisans changed dramatically after the election of President Donald Trump, with Republicans becoming much more optimistic and Democrats much more pessimistic. Republicans’ optimism about the direction of the nation went up 44 percentage points (17% in October, 61% in January), and their optimism about the country’s economic outlook rose 56 points (27% in October, 83% in January). On the other hand, Democrats became much more pessimistic, with a 37 point drop in optimism about the direction of the nation (57% in October, 20% in January) and a 20 point decline in economic optimism (58% in October, 38% in January). On both measures, independents were more optimistic in January (up 10 points on direction of the nation, up 13 points on economic outlook).

While the partisan differences were the most evident, there were also changes across racial/ethnic groups. Notably, there was a drop in optimism about the direction of the nation among Latinos (down 22 points, from 53% in October to 31% in January) and Asian Americans (down 21 points, from 55% in October to 34% in January). Latinos were also less optimistic about the economic outlook of the nation (down 12 points, from 58% in October to 46% in January), while there was a sharp increase in economic optimism among whites (up 24 points, from 36% in October to 60% in January).

As President Trump works to implement his policies, we will continue to periodically track Californians’ views of the state of the nation as well as monitor partisan and demographic differences.

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Read the January PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government
Find out more about the PPIC Statewide Survey

Video: Feinstein on Her Role in a New World

Senator Dianne Feinstein was clear about the challenges ahead for a California Democrat in contentious times.

“Here we are: outnumbered, outvoted, in the West, fairly liberal,” she said.

Speaking before an energetic capacity crowd in San Francisco, Feinstein said her office had received more than a million phone calls about Trump’s cabinet nominees. She described her approach to them: careful evaluation, rather than blanket opposition—an approach too conciliatory for some sign-carrying audience members. Feinstein said that in her role on the Senate Judiciary Committee, she needed to work with the administration officials in charge of national security and felt she could work with Trump appointees James Mattis, defense secretary; John Kelley, secretary of homeland security; and Mike Pompeo, CIA director. But she opposed other nominees because they lacked credentials for the job or they aren’t right for the county, she said. Nevertheless, they went on to win approval.

“The key for me is to figure out how we can begin to win some of these battles.”

Asked about Trump’s nominee to the Supreme Court, Neil Gorsuch, Feinstein wouldn’t say how she would vote. She said she will be particularly interested in his views on gun laws and on women’s reproductive rights.

Feinstein’s visit was greeted by dozens of protesters who marched outside, upset that she had not hosted a traditional town hall. Inside, Feinstein touched on a range of issues from climate change to immigration to health care, in a wide-ranging conversation with Mark Baldassare, PPIC president and CEO. His questions included a number that PPIC solicited online in advance of the event.

Video: An Early Look at Views of President Trump

The January PPIC Statewide Survey asked Californians for to assess their new leaders in Washington and found that just a third of Californians, or 30%, approve of the way President Trump is doing his job. Californians gave Congress a similar rating.

Dean Bonner, associate survey director, presented these and other key findings at a briefing in Sacramento. The survey also examined contentious issues that are the focus of national debate.

  • Solid majorities of Californians favor state action—independent of the federal government—to protect the rights of undocumented immigrants and to address global warming.
  • About half of Californians have favorable opinions of the Affordable Care Act, and a slight majority oppose repealing it.
  • Most Californians—across political parties—say the government should not interfere with a woman’s access to abortion.

The survey also looked at views of Governor Brown’s job performance and his proposed budget. The governor job approval rating is at a record-high 66%. But his budget proposal and his plan to fund maintenance of the state’s roads, highways, and bridges fares less well. Just under half of residents support his budget plan and 41 percent support his transportation proposal.

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Read the January PPIC Statewide Survey
Learn more about the PPIC Statewide Survey

California’s 4.5 Million Trump Voters

In the November election, California voters passed several ballot initiatives acting on liberal priorities, and votes for Hillary Clinton in the state exceeded votes for Donald Trump by a two-to-one margin. Nevertheless, 4.5 million Californians voted for Donald Trump—7% of his total support across the country. California’s Trump voters stand apart from other voters—both those who supported past Republican presidential nominees and Clinton supporters—in important ways. But many Trump voters align with California’s Democratic majority on issues of taxation and undocumented immigrants.

California Trump voters’ low level of trust in the federal government is one of the major ways that they differ from other voters. The October PPIC Statewide Survey found that 81% of Trump voters say the federal government is run by a few big interests, wastes a lot of taxpayer money, and only does what is right sometimes (or never), compared to only 24% of Clinton voters. The large gap on these questions between Trump and Clinton voters in 2016 stands in sharp contrast to 2008, when McCain and Obama voters were about equally likely to express distrust (55% and 57%, respectively).

Yet there are some areas of overlap between Trump and Clinton voters. In California’s US Senate race between two Democrats, PPIC surveys indicate that about half of Trump voters decided not to participate. Of those who indicated they would vote, though, Trump voters were about evenly split between Kamala Harris—preferred by most Clinton voters (58%)—and Loretta Sanchez. In October, we found a noteworthy 22% of Trump voters saying they would vote for Harris, who was ultimately the winner of the seat.

Another winner in November was Proposition 55, which extended a tax on high incomes in California. While Clinton voters were far more likely than Trump voters (75% to 24%) to say they favored the tax extension, a quarter of Trump voters said they would vote yes. It’s likely that many of them contributed to the success of the measure, which passed with 63% support.

Immigration is another policy area with some notable overlap in opinions between Trump and Clinton supporters. Although Trump voters were far more likely than Clinton voters to support building a wall along the border with Mexico (82% to 7%), a majority of Trump voters (52%) agreed with the 95% of Clinton voters who said undocumented immigrants should be allowed to stay in the country if certain requirements are met. As California policymakers consider potential responses to a change in federal immigration policy, it will be interesting to see how Trump’s voters feel about new federal and state action.

Though California remains a Democratic-majority state, millions of Californians voted for the president-elect in November. While there are large differences in opinion between them and Clinton supporters, neither group is monolithic, and our survey findings suggest some potential areas of cooperation between them.

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Find out more about the PPIC Statewide Survey

The Turnout Turnaround

Voter turnout in California was dismal in 2014—record lows in the primary and general elections prompted serious concern about how to turn the problem around. The state has been aggressive in adopting reforms to promote turnout—including a system for registering online, “conditional” registration, which allows people to vote after registering as late as election day, and a system to register voters mostly by default via the DMV.

The Secretary of State recently certified the vote count for the November election, and the results suggest the state is heading in the right direction. Turnout was 58.7% among those eligible to vote, easily higher than the 30.9% showing in the midterm election two years ago, but also higher than the presidential election four years ago (55.5%) and almost as high as the notably high-turnout election in 2008 (59.2%).

In fact, while low turnout in the 2014 general election put California farther behind other states, this year’s turnout almost brought the state up to the national average. As the graph shows, turnout in presidential elections has been climbing in all states since about 2000. But this is the first time that the upward trend has been stronger in California than elsewhere.

Some of this upward surge may reflect higher registration rates: the share of eligible residents who are registered rose this election year to a 20-year high. The state’s recent reforms can’t explain this increase because most of them have not been implemented yet. The exception is online registration, which went live during the 2012 presidential election cycle and has proved popular. Early evidence suggested that the new system’s overall impact on registration was small, but this could have changed over time. In any case, the higher registration rate this year might lead to higher levels of participation in the future.

There are reasons to think that the higher turnout and registration were driven by a more mobilized Latino population. Certainly, Latino registration increased this year, perhaps in response to the tone and content of the presidential campaign. And Californians voted at even higher rates for Hillary Clinton than they did for Barack Obama, something many have also attributed to increased Latino engagement. However, there is little support for this story in the county-level results. The size of each county’s eligible Latino population explains almost none of the variation in turnout this year. In fact, the higher turnout this year was evenly distributed across the state.

Despite the signs of increased engagement, it is too early to say the state has come out of its turnout slump. As the figure makes clear, turnout in presidential elections is not the state’s biggest problem. The challenge is and has been midterm turnout. A growing share of the voters who participate in presidential elections do not vote in the gubernatorial election two years later. The last two election cycles—which have seen exceptionally high presidential turnout and exceptionally low midterm turnout—have not departed from this pattern but exemplified it.

The state should be proud of the progress made this election, and there are grounds for optimism as the state rolls out its election reforms over the next few years. But the positive signs from this election cycle should not make policymakers complacent about the challenges that lie ahead.

California’s Marijuana Majority


Mark Baldassare, PPIC president and CEO and director of the PPIC Statewide Survey, spoke at the Pacific Chapter of the American Association of Public Opinion Research annual conference in San Francisco today, December 16, 2016. Here are his prepared remarks for a post-election panel discussion.

One of the most historic turnarounds in California initiative history has been largely overlooked in the wake of the stunning presidential election results. Californians passed a recreational marijuana initiative this fall after rejecting a similar effort six years ago. The 2010 initiative, Proposition 19, failed with 46.5 percent of the vote. This year, Proposition 64 passed with 57.1 percent. How did support grow by 10.6 points, allowing this controversial policy to move into the victory column? The answers are found in both national and state trends.

First, Americans’ views on marijuana legalization have shifted in recent years. When asked in Pew Research Center national surveys, “Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal or not,” fewer than 50 percent said “yes” in 2010 and 2011 while a majority have said “yes” since 2013. Two key events happened in 2012: Washington and Colorado voters passed initiatives to legalize recreational marijuana. Alaska, Oregon, and Washington, DC, voters followed in 2014. This November, Massachusetts and Nevada—and perhaps Maine, depending on a recount underway—joined California voters in legalizing recreational marijuana.

California public opinion mirrors these changing national attitudes. PPIC surveys have been repeating the Pew Research Center’s question for six years. In our surveys, the percent of adults saying “yes” to legalizing marijuana was below 50 percent before November 2010, when Proposition 19 failed. Support for legalization edged up to the majority in 2013. Some Californians apparently changed their minds about marijuana legalization after other states passed initiatives.

Did California’s marijuana legalization pass because its base of support grew stronger? Or because its appeal expanded to more demographic groups? The answer is “both” when we analyze the final PPIC surveys before the November 2010 and November 2016 elections. These surveys were within close range of the election results (44% Proposition 19, 55% Proposition 64) with a comparable 11-point difference between 2010 and 2016. We compare the likely voters who said “yes” to Propositions 19 and 64 across parties, political, and demographic groups.

The only majority supporters of Proposition 19 in 2010 were Democrats, liberals, and Californians under 35 years old. This fall, there were double-digit increases in the yes vote for Proposition 64 among Democrats, liberals, and residents under age 35. The consolidation of support in these groups was important in the 2016 California election context. This presidential election attracted a larger electorate with liberal leanings than the 2010 gubernatorial election did. That is reflected in the passage of several progressive reform and tax initiatives this November, as noted in an earlier PPIC blog post.

Significantly, there were also double-digit increases in the yes vote for Proposition 64 in likely voter groups where Proposition 19 had previously fallen short. Notably, independents, moderates, and 35- to 54-year-olds joined Democrats, liberals, and younger voters to form a broader political and demographic coalition of Proposition 64 supporters this fall. Moreover, support grew from less than 50 percent in 2010 to include solid majorities in 2016 among men (47% to 64%), college graduates (47% to 61%), those earning $80,000 or more (46% to 60%), and whites (44% to 55%). In sum, Proposition 64 attracted more of a political mainstream following than Proposition 19 did.

Proposition 64 still did not win by a landslide even with these impressive gains in the depth and breadth of support. Fewer than 50 percent in key demographic groups supported the initiative. They include Republicans (33%), conservatives (31%), Californians age 55 and older (45%), Latinos (47%), women (48%), and the non-college educated (49%). Obviously, many Californians did not jump on the bandwagon and vote for marijuana legalization this year.

Finally, it is worth noting that when we asked voters if the outcome of the vote on Proposition 64 was very important to them, opponents of legalization were more likely to say “yes” than supporters were (60% to 50%). These views could play a critical role because marijuana legalization still faces many hurdles. Will the deep divisions among political and demographic groups surface in local communities when it’s time to implement the new law? Will California lawmakers side with the voters who passed marijuana legalization if the Republican president and Congress change direction on federal enforcement? As always in the initiative process, voters were the deciders but they are not the last word. Now many issues are left to local, state, and federal government officials to sort out.

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Medi-Cal and the Fall Election

Lost in the sound and fury of the national election are the results of four statewide ballot initiatives that aimed to bolster financing of the Medi-Cal program. Medi-Cal is California’s version of Medicaid, which pays for the health care of low-income families, many elderly who live in nursing homes, and—with the passage of the Affordable Care Act—single low-income adults. The state spends nearly $19 billion annually from the General Fund (and $87 billion from all sources) to provide medical coverage for 13.5 million Californians through Medi-Cal.

Three of the four initiatives passed on November 8, providing up to $3 billion in additional funds for Medi-Cal each year. But it will take a while for Californians to see the concrete outcomes of their votes. And, as is often the case with initiatives, the impact of these measures will depend on questions that have yet to be answered. The three measures that passed include:

  • Proposition 52: This initiative permanently extends the fees hospitals pay to the state, which the state then uses to get federal matching funds to support Medi-Cal. This translates to about $1 billion in state General Fund savings annually – providing this system continues to be allowed under federal law. There wasn’t much doubt that the state would seek to extend these fees past the sunset date of January 1, 2018, since they reduce pressure on the General Fund. But the initiative makes it more difficult for the legislature to modify the hospital fee program.
  • Proposition 55: Extending the tax on high-income earners will generate between $4 billion and $9 billion each year to pay for K–12 education and community colleges, Medi-Cal, and other budget priorities. For Medi-Cal, this is expected to provide up to $2 billion annually starting in 2018. But the amount may vary significantly from year to year for several reasons. First, K–12 education gets first call on the new revenue. In addition, the amount of new revenue will be affected by the volatility in what high-income taxpayers earn. Thus, the governor and legislature will have to learn to cope with an undependable funding source for Medi-Cal.
  • Proposition 56: Higher tobacco taxes will generate up to $1 billion for Medi-Cal in 2017–18. Revenue from tobacco taxes has generally fallen each year as the number of smokers in California has declined, and the new tax may accelerate that trend. While building these funds into the Medi-Cal budget may strengthen the program now, the state’s General Fund could face increasing pressure in the future if this source of funding declines. The state legislature and governor will determine how to use these funds as part of budget discussions next spring.

The fourth initiative affecting the Medi-Cal program, Proposition 61, failed to garner a majority of votes. Perhaps not surprisingly, more questions were raised about the impact of this initiative than the other three. Proposition 61 prohibited the state from paying more for prescription drugs than the federal US Department of Veterans Affairs, which typically pays the lowest prices of any public or private entity. The measure’s intent was to reduce the cost of prescription drugs in California, but the fiscal analysis by the Legislative Analyst’s Office suggested that the savings were uncertain.

While the new funds for Medi-Cal will be welcome, it remains to be seen whether they will provide reliable support for the program. Plus, there are questions about how the new president and Congress will alter the Affordable Care Act and how that will affect the state’s program. For instance, the law allowed California to extend Medi-Cal coverage to single low-income adults. In the 2016–17 state budget, coverage for this group cost about $15 billion annually, with the federal government picking up 95% of the tab. If the federal government significantly reduces or eliminates this enhanced funding rate, the $3 billion in new revenues generated by the three initiatives will not be enough to operate California’s expanded Medi-Cal program without other fiscal support.